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sum of $3,000 in cash. Appellant filed a protest against such 
proposed exchange, on the ground that the estate had not been 
distributed. However, the said petition was granted on the 
ground that the exchange of the respective properties was for 
the best interests of the ,estate. The order recited that notice 
of hearing has been duly given and that evidence both oral 
and documentary had been introduced. The court had ju-
risdiction to entertain the petition as presented, and there is 
no showing that the order was void on its face. No appeal 
from such order was filed until September 27, 1937. The 
order had become final long prior to the last-mentioned date, 
and the present attack comes too late to be of any avail to 
appellant. 
[6] It therefore follows that appellant's present objections 
to the two orders herein attacked may not be successfully 
urged on this appeal which was taken from the decree settling 
the final accounts of Wm. G. Richards' successor. To enter-
tain those objections at this time would be to put the starq.p of 
approval on an action which amounts to no more than a col-
lateral attack on the said two orders. 
From the foregoing it follows that the decree settling ac-
counts and ordering distribution should be, and it hereby is, 
affirmed. 
[Sac. No. 5315. In Bank.-February 3, 1941.] 
In the Matter of the Estate of RUSH B. TODD, Deceased. 
RIDGEWAY ADDISON TODD, a Minor, etc., Appel-
lant, v. INEZ TODD, Respondent. 
[1] Wills-Disinheritance-Succession by Pretermitted Issue-
Persons to Whom Rule Applies-Grandchildren.-By Probate 
Code, section 90, providing for succession by child or the issue 
of a deceased .child omitted from a will, "whether born be-
fore or after the making of the will or before or after the 
death of the testator", etc., if the issue of a testator's child 
is not provided for by the will, such issue shall succeed to a 
1. See 26 Cal. Jur. 918. 
McK. Dig. References: 1, 4. Wills, § 313; 2. Statutes, § 181; 
3. Wills, § 343. 
~ 
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share of the estate by intestate succession the same as if no 
will had been made regardless of whether the testator's child 
dies before or after the making of the will, assuming that the 
testator's child dies before the testator. (Estate of Childs, 
21 Cal. App. (2d) 103, 68 Pac. (2d) 306, is disapproved.) 
[2] Statutes-Construction and Interpretation-Aids to Construc-
tion-Change of Language.-Ordinarily any essential change 
in the phraseology of a statute indicates an intention on the 
part of the legislature to change its meaning, rather than to interpret it. 
(3] WillS-Failed Gifts and Undisposed of Property-Lapsing and 
Substitution-Substitutional Provisions.-Where a will devises 
an estate to the testator's wife and his son, or the survivor 
of them, the intention is to substitute the wife as sole legatee 
in the event of the death of the Son. 
(4] ld.-Disinheritance-Succession by Pretermitted Issue-Per_ 
sons to Whom Rule Applies-Child of Deceased Devisee or 
Legatee as not Within RUle.-If the child of a deceased devi-
see or legatee is entitled to succeed to his parent's share 
under Prob. Code, § 92, he is not entitled to claim a share as 
a pretermitted heir under Prob. Code, § 90. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Oourt of 
Sonoma Oounty decreeing final distribution of an estate. 
Hilliard Oomstock, JUdge. Reversed with directions. 
Henry E. Monroe, Julia M. Easley and Geary & Geary and 
C. J. Tauzer for Appellant. 
Grove J. Fink and Garton D. Keyston for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-This is an appeal from a decree of final dis-
tribution, which distributed the entire estate of Rush B. 
Todd, deceased, to his surviving wife, Inez Todd, one of re-
spondents herein. The whole of said estate was decedent's 
separate property. The appellant is Ridgeway Addison Todd, 
a minor, the grandson of the decedent and being the son of 
Addison Todd, the son of decedent. Addison Todd died prior 
to the death of decedent. The other respondent is the execu-
tor of the estate. 
The facts are undisputed. The decedent made his will 
on February 17, 1925, in which it was provided in part: 
"Paragraph Third: I hereby declare that I am married, that 
2. See 23 Cal Jur. 722; 25 R. C. L. 1018. 
,i, : 
272 ESTATE OF TODD. [17 C. (2d) 
my wife's name is Inez Todd, and that I have one child liv-
ing, to-wit, a son, Addison Todd. Paragraph Fifth: I hereby 
give, devise and bequeath all of my estate, ... equally, share 
and share alike, to my said wife, Inez Todd, and my said 
son, .Addison Todd, or to the survivor of them." No men-
tion of appellant, decedent's grandson, was made in the will, 
he was not provided for by settlement or advancement; and it 
does not appear· from the will that the omission was inten-
tional. 
Appellant, grandson of decedent, was born on May 7, 1931. 
Addison Todd, decedent's son, died on September 28, 1935, 
and left appellant surviving him as his sole issue. Decedent 
died on May 16, 1936. The decree of distribution distributed 
the decedent's entire estate to Inez Todd, his surviving wife. 
Appellant urges as grounds for reversal of the decree that 
appellant shOUld take one-half of the estate by virtue of sec-
tion 90 of the Probate Code, and that even if he cannot pre-
vail on that basis he is entitled to one-half the estate by reason 
of the death of his father, one of the legatees in the will, prior 
to decedent's death, pursuant to section 92 of the Probate 
Code. 
It is clear that if appellant comes within the terms of sec-
tion 90 of the Probate Code, he is entitled to disregard the 
will and receive the portion of the estate allowed to him under 
the laws of intestate succession, which in the instant case is 
one-half of decedent's property inasmuch as it was separate 
property and decedent's wife survived him. (Prob. Code, 
secs. 90 and 221.) 
Prior to the adoption of section 90 of the Probate Code 
in 1931, the law concerning pretermitted heirs was embodied 
in sections 1306, 1307, 1308 and 1309 of the Civil Code. Sec-
tion 1306 provided for inheritance by a child born after the 
will and provided in part: "Whenever a testator has a child 
born after the making of his will, either in his lifetime or 
after his death, and dies leaving such child unprovided for by 
any settlement, and neither provided for nor in any way 
mentioned in his will, the child succeeds to the same portion 
of the testator's ... property that he would have succeeded 
to if the testator had died intestate." Section 1308 related 
to the sources from which a pretermitted heir's share should 
come. This is now stated in section 91 of the Probate Code. 
Section 1309 provided that the pretermitted heir take no share 
=~.~.~-~.------~,--. ~,,-~----~~-> 
~ 
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if he had an equal share by advancement. This is now em-
braced in section 90 of the Probate Code. The portion of 
section 1307 which is here particularly pertinent read: "When 
any testator omits to provide in his will for any of his chil-
dren, or for the issue of any deceased child, unless it ap-
pears that such omiss~on was intentional, such child, or the 
issue of such child, has the same share in the estate of the 
testator as if he had died intestate, and succeeds thereto as 
provided in the preceding section (1306). . . . " Section 
1307 was first construed in In re Barter, 86 Cal. 441 [25 Pac. 
15], and it was there held that the failure of the testator to 
provide for his grandchild did not make such grandchild a 
pretermitted heir, where the grandchild's mother was alive 
at the time the will was made but died prior to the death of 
the testator. The decision was properly based on the ground 
that section 1307 made pretermitted heirs of only those grand-
children who were the issue of a child of the testator dead at 
the time the will was made. With section 1307 remaining 
unchanged, the Barter case was considered favorably in Estat·e 
of Ross, 140 Cal. 282 [73 Pac. 976], and Estate of Matthews, 
176 Cal. 576 [169 Pac. 233], although the exact question in-
volved in the Barter case was not in issue in either of those 
cases. 
[1] However, in 1931, sections 1306, 1307, 1308 and 1309 
of the Civil Code were repealed and section 90 of the Probate 
Code was adopted and contains additional clauses radically 
changing those sections in certain respects. Section 90, the 
law controlling in the instant case, provides in part: "When 
a testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children, 
or for the issue of any deceased child, whether born before 
or after the rnaking of the will or before or after the death 
of the testator, ... unless it appears from the will that such 
omission was intentional, such child or such issue succeeds 
to the same share in the estate of the testator as if he had 
died intestate." The italicized portions are the clauses which 
did not appear in sections 1306 or 1307 of the Civil Code. We 
believe it is quite obvious that the legislature intended to 
change the law and the rule announced in the Barter case 
to provide that if the issue of a testator's child is not pro-
vided for by the will, such issue shall succeed to a share of 
the est;1te by intestate succession the same as if no will had 
been made regardless of whether the testator's child dies be-
~ 
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fore or after the will is made, and whether the issue of the 
child is born before or after the making of the will, assuming, 
of course, the testator's child dies before the testator. To 
determine that no such change was accomplished as contended 
by respondents, and held by the trial court would be to render 
ineffective and practically meaningless the words added by 
the adoption of section 90. To assume that the change ac-
complished was limited to grandchildren born after the will 
was executed but whose parent was dead when the will was 
made, would be a strained and unreasonable construction. 
At the best it would make the added words fit only extremely 
rare instances and would be manifestly unjust as it' would 
confer a right as a pretermitted heir on the child of a testa-
tor's son but deny that right to a child of the testator's 
daughter. This limited application of the added words as 
interpreted in Estate of Ohilds, 21 Cal. App. (2d) 103 [68 
Pac. (2d) 306], is relied upon by respondents in support of 
the holding of the trial court. This holding is contrary to 
the views above expressed. In Estate of Ohilds, supra, it is 
stated, at page 105, that the only effect of the added words 
is: "These words might serve to give protection to a grand-
child born after the execution of the will whose parent was! 
dead at the time of its execution." Manifestly, such a child . 
would have'received protection even under section 1307 of the 
Civil Code. Therefore the Ilrdded words would be meaningless. 
But assuming such protection did not exist prior to the adop-
tion of section 90 and that the added words gave only such 
protection, then that protection could never be enjoyed by 
the issue of a daughter of the testator because if such issue 
were born after the death of the testator the daughter could 
riot have predeceased the testator, whereas the issue of a 
testator's son would be protected, but even such issue to come 
within the protected class would be limited to those born not 
later than the normal period of gestation after a time just 
prior to the testator's death, assuming the son died just prior 
to, such death. We cannot believe that the legislature in-
tended to give such a limited effect or make such a discrimina-
tion by the added words which is patently unreasonable and un-
just. To countenance such a construction would violate the well 
settled rules of statutory construction. [2] " Ordinarily, it 
would seem that any essential change in the phraseology of a 
statutory provision would indicate an intention on the part of 
Feb. 1941.J ESTATE OF TODD. 275 
the legislature to change the meaning of such provision rather 
than interpret it." (Young v. Three for One Oil Royalties, 
1 Cal. (2d) 639, 646 [36 Pac. (2d) 1065J.) Section 3542 
of the Civil Code provides: "Interpretation must be rea-
sonable." It is said in 23 Cal. Jur. 722, 723: " 'Interpreta-
tion must be reasonable.' The code so provides. And it has 
been decided, not only that the language of a statute must 
be given a reasonable interpretation, but that every statute 
as a whole must be so construed, and thus, when opportunity 
arises, made compatible with common sense and the dictates of 
justice. In other words, it is the duty of courts not to be 
ingenious to find ambiguities in statutes because of extraneous 
matters, but to interpret them in such a manner that they 
may be free from ambiguity, and to give, if possible, a con-
struction which not only renders them constitutional, but 
which is consistent with sound sense and wise policy, with a 
view to promoting justice." 
For the foregoing reasons, that part of the decision in 
Estate of Ohilds, s~tpra, apparently holding that the protec-
tion to pretermitted heirs does not extend to a grandchild 
where the testator's child did not die until after the execution 
of the will, is expressly disapproved. 
Respondents contend that because section 1306 of the Civil 
Code did contain the words "Whenever a testator has a child 
born after the making of his will, either in his lifetime or 
after his death" the clauses above mentioned appearing in 
section 90 of the Probate Code were not in fact added. The 
obvious answer to that proposition is that whereas section 1306 
was concerned solely with the protection of an after-born 
child, that is, a child born after a will is executed, section 90 
of the Probate Code provides for not only after-born children, 
but also the protection of the issue of such children. 
[3] Appellant insists that if the above-mentioned propo-
sition is determined adversely to him, he is nevertheless en-
titled to half the estate under section 92 of the Probate Code, 
in his capacity as successor of his deceased father who was a 
legatee under the will. The will devises the estate to re-
spondent, Inez Todd and the decedent's son, or the survivor 
of them. 
In our opinion it was the testator's intention to substitute 
respondent Inez Todd as sole legatee under his will in the 
event 9f the death of his son, Addison Todd. This would 
I, ! 
i I 
, , 
I' 
i 
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preclude appellant from taking any portion of the estate 
under section 92 of the Probate Code. [4] However, if ap-
pellant could under the terms of the will have succeeded to the 
share of the estate devised or bequeathed to his father under 
the provisions of said section 92, he would be barred from 
sharing in the estate as a pretermitted heir under the pro-
visions of section 90 of said code. 
The decree of distribution is reversed with direction to 
. the court below to enter a decree in accordance with the 
views herein expressed. 
Shenk, J., Peters, J., pro tem., Ward, J., pro tem., and Gib-
son, C. J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring.-I concur. 
Decedent, Rush Todd, disposed of his estate by will as 
follows: "I hereby give, devise and bequeath all of my es-
tate, ... equally, share and share alike, to my said wife 
Inez Todd, and my said son, Addison Todd, or to the sur-
vivor of them." In 1931, more than six years after the mak-
ing of this will, Ridgeway Todd, son of Addison Todd and 
grandson of the testator, was born. No provision was made 
for him in the will. Addison Todd died in 1935 leaving his 
father and his son surviving him. Rush Todd, the testator, 
died in 1936. The decree of distribution gave the entire estate 
to Inez Todd, his surviving wife. Ridgeway Todd has ap-
pealed from this decree of distribution contending that (1) by 
virtue of Probate Code, section 90, he is a pretermitted heir 
and therefore entitled to one-half the estate as his intestate 
share and (2) Probate Code, section 92, entitles him to suc-
ceed to his father's share of the estate under the will. 
Section 90 of the Probate Code provides: "When a tes-
tator omits to provide in his will for any of his children, 
or for the issue of any deceased child, whether born before 
or after the making of the will or before or after the death 
of the testator, and such child or issue are unprovided for by 
any settlement, and have not had an equal proportion of the 
testator's property bestowed on them by way of advancement, 
unless it appears from the will that such omission was inten-
tional, such child or such issue succeeds to the same share 
in the estate of the testator as if he had died intestate." 
Section 92 of the Probate Code provides: "If a devisee or 
legatee dies during the lifetime of the testator, the testamen-
-l' 
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tary disposition to him fails unless an intention appears to 
substitute another in his place j except that when any estate 
is devised or bequeathed to any kindred of the testator, and 
the devisee or legatee dies before the testator, leaving lineal 
descendants, or is dead at the time the will is executed, but 
leaves lineal descendants surviving the testator, such de-
scendants take the estate so given by the will in the same 
manner as the devisee or legatee would have done had he 
survived the testator." 
Section 90 cannot be properly interpreted without taking 
into account the effect of section 92. In the ordinary situa-
tion where a testator is predeceased by his child who leaves 
a surviving child, the grandchild will succeed to his parent's 
share under the will by virtue of section 92. If the grand-
child has received no express mention in the will may he also 
be regarded as a pretermitted heir under section 90 with the 
right to claim his intestate share of the estate in addition to 
that portion which he takes by virtue of section 92 Y The 
majority opinion states that he may not but gives no reason 
for reaching that conclusion. 
A grandchild who will take his predeceased parent's share 
under a will by virtue of section 92 cannot be a pretermitted 
heir under section 90. When a testator provides for his child 
by will with no alternate disposition in the event that the 
child predeceases him, he has by law also provided for any 
issue of the child, since the issue will take in the place of 
the parent under section 92. The testator has not, therefore, 
omitted to provide for the issue of any deceased child within 
the meaning of secti()n 90. He has provided for such issue 
by operation of law j if the testator's child predeceases him, 
the grandchild will succeed to his parent's share under section 
92 and hence cannot be a pretermitted heir under section 90. 
Thus, suppose a testator provides among other bequests one 
of $10,000 for his son but makes no mention of a grandson. 
Suppose further that the son predeceases the testator and 
that the grandson's intestate share under section 90 would 
be $100,000. The grandson by virtue of section 92 will take 
only the $10,000 in place of his father, and not the $100,000 
under section 90. 
In the present case the question of whether or not the grand-
son, Ridgeway Todd, is a pretermitted heir under section 90, 
turns upon the determination of whether or not he succeeds 
" 
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to his parent's share under section 92. The import of section 
92 is that if a testator makes a testamentary disposition in 
favor of his child which fails by virtue of the child 's pre~ 
deceasing the testator, no substitute legatee having been 
named, the issue of such child will take in place of his parent. 
If, however, the testator has provided that the property should 
go to an alternate legatee in such a situation, then such al-
ternate will take the property by virtue of the terms of the 
will and, there being no lapse of the legacy, the issue of the 
predeceased child will be able to claim nothing under section 
92. 
In the present case the testator provided that his estate 
should go to his wife and his son, or to the survivor. Upon 
the death of the son therefore the right to receive the entire 
estate passed to the wife under the terms of the will and 
'. the grandson, Ridgeway Todd, cannot claim an interest in the 
. estate under section 92. 
The problem remains as to whether he is a pretermitted 
·heir under section 90. If the grandchild of a testator is to 
take as a pretermitted heir under section 90, the grandchild's 
parent must have predeceased the testator. It is respondent's 
• contention, however, that the grandchild can only take as a 
pretermitted heir if his parent was dead at the time the will 
was made; that if the parent was alive at the time the will 
was made, the testator's duty was to provide only for his 
then living child, and that if such child subsequently pre-
,deceases the testator, a surviving grandchild is not a pre-
i termitted heir within the meaning of section 90. In re Barter, 
86 Cal. 441 [25 Pac. 15], construing Civil Code, section 1307, t, 
. now replaced- by section 90, held that a grandchild was not 
rendered pretermitted by the testator's failure to provide for 
him when his parent was alive at the time the will was made 
·.even though the parent predeceased the testator. Section 
1307 then provided: "When any testator omits to provide 
in his will for any of his children, or for the issue of any 
deceased child, unless it appears that such omission was in-
tentional, such child, or the issue of such child, has the same 
,share in the estate of the testator as if he had died intestate 
... " Following the repeal of sections 1306, 1307, 1308 and 
1309 of the Civil Code in 1931, however, section 90 of the 
Probate Code was adopted and the following italicized clause 
·wasadded: "When a testator omits to provide in his will for 
~ 
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any of his children, or for the issue of any deceased child, 
whether born before or after the making of the will or be-
fore or after the death of the testator . . . unless it appears 
from the will that such omission was intentional, such child 
or issue succeeds to the same share in the estate of the tes-
tator as if he had died intestate." Despite its ambiguity, 
the most reasonable construction to be placed upon this added 
clause is that the legislature thereby intended to change the 
rule of the Barter case under former section 1307 and to pro-
vide that a grandchild could be pretermitted even though his 
parent, who subsequently predeceased the testator, was alive 
at the time of the making of the will. Unless the added, 
clause is so construed it must either be disregarded entirely 
with respect to grandchildren or limited to situations where 
the testator's son has died before the making of the will but 
the son's wife has given birth to a child thereafter. (Estate 
of Ohilds, 21 Cal. App. (2d) 103 [68 Pac. (2d) 306].) Since 
such a grandchild would have been protected under the old 
section 1307, it is more reasonable to hold that in permitting 
'the issue of a predeceased child, born before or after the 
making of the will, to be regarded as pretermitted, the legisla-
ture intended to include any child born at any time after the 
making of the will even though his parent was alive when 
the will was made. This view is reinforced by the reference 
in the clause to issue born before or after the death of the 
testator, which, with respect to grandchildren, would' seem 
designed to cover the situation where a testator's son has 
predeceased the testator after the making of the will but the 
son's wife has given birth to a child after the testator's death. 
The only other possible interpretation with respect to grand-
children would limit the application of this part of the clause 
to the unusual situation in which the testator's son dies, the 
testator makes his will, the testato1' dies, and the son's wife 
gives birth to a child, all in the order given, within a period 
of nine months. 
In this light Ridgeway Todd must be conSidered a preter-
mitted heir under the provisions of Probate Code, section 90, 
and he is therefore entitled to one-half of his srandfather's 
estate as his intestate share. (Prob. Code, sec. 221.) 
A petition for a rehearing was denied March 3, 194L 
'it; 
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